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ABSTRACT 
This Article investigates the legal and economic environment for 
private equity investments in Brazil, Russia, India and China 
(“BRIC”). In contrast with disappointing returns in the 1990s,  
private equity investment has soared in developing countries over 
the past decade. To explain what has led to the recent success of 
private equity in the BRICs, this Article will first give an overview 
of the challenges faced generally when investing in portfolio 
companies in developing markets and then analyze the legal and 
economic framework for each of the four BRICs. This Article finds 
that Brazil and China offer the best opportunities for private equity 
because investors can rely on strong domestic capital markets for the 
exit. While India is not far behind, Russia still has room for 
improvement, particularly with regard to the reliability of its legal 
system and the attractiveness of its capital markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 On November 30, 2001, Jim O’Neill, then Goldman Sachs’ 
Head of Global Economic Research, coined the term “BRICs,” referring 
to the growing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.1 He 
predicted that, “over the next 10 years, the weight of the BRICs and 
especially China in world GDP will grow”2 and that “by 2011 China 
                                                                                                                 
 1. JIM O’NEILL, GOLDMAN SACHS, GLOBAL ECON. PAPER NO: 66, BUILDING 
BETTER GLOBAL ECONOMIC BRICS (2001), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com 
/our-thinking/topics/brics/brics-reports-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf; see Beth Kowitt, 
For Mr. Bric, Nations Meeting a Milestone, CNN MONEY (June 17, 2009, 2:52 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/17/news/economy/goldman_sachs_jim_oneill_interview
.fortune/index.htm. 
 2. O’NEILL, supra note 1, at 1. 
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will actually be as big as Germany on a current GDP basis, and Brazil 
and India not far behind Italy.”3 Another Goldman Sachs Economics 
paper later forecasted that “[t]he BRICs economies taken together could 
be larger than the G6 by 2039.”4 In 2007, China already surpassed 
Germany in current gross domestic product (“GDP”), outrunning Jim 
O’Neill’s prediction by four years.5 By 2011, Brazil was the sixth largest 
economy, Russia ninth, and India tenth.6 The BRIC phenomenon has 
now taken a political dimension as well. In May 2008, Russia hosted the 
first BRIC summit, followed by Brazil in 2010.7 
As competition for attractive targets within the United States 
increases steadily, American private equity firms gradually look for 
more investments in the global markets.8 Europe would be a potential 
market as it provides the appropriate legal infrastructure, but it cannot 
compete with the high growth rates of the emerging markets.9 
Additionally, low company valuations in markets with capital shortages 
provide more opportunity for high returns.10 Therefore, capital in the 
private equity industry is increasingly flowing from developed countries 
into developing markets. Over the past decade, fundraising for emerging 
markets private equity funds has grown exponentially from $3.2 billion 
in 2002 to a record high of $66.5 billion in 2008.11 During the same 
period, investments in emerging markets rose from $2 billion to $47.8 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Id. at 6. 
 4. DOMINIC WILSON & ROOPA PURUSHOTHAMAN, GOLDMAN SACHS, GLOBAL 
ECON. PAPER NO: 99, DREAMING WITH BRICS: THE PATH TO 2050, at 3 (2003), 
available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf. 
 5. See Indicators, GDP (current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Gillian Tett, The Man Who Named the Future, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 16, 
2010, at 30.  
 8. See HEINO MEERKATT & HEINRICH LIECHTENSTEIN, ET AL., NEW MARKETS, 
NEW RULES: WILL EMERGING MARKETS RESHAPE PRIVATE EQUITY? 3 (2010), available 
at http://www.bcg.com/documents/file64907.pdf. 
 9. See Gonzalo Pacanins, Private Equity in Developing Countries (1997) 
(unpublished MBA essay, Harvard Business School), available at http://www.people.h 
bs.edu/jlerner/develop.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
 10. See Roger Leeds & Julie Sunderland, Private Equity Investing in Emerging 
Markets, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 111, 112 (2003). 
 11. EMERGING MKTS. PRIVATE EQUITY ASS’N, FULL-YEAR 2011 INDUSTRY 
STATISTICS (2012) [hereinafter EMPEA], available at http://www.empea.org/research/d 
ata-and-statistics/full-year-2011-em-pe-industry-statistics/. 
1310 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
billion, with a record high of $53.1 billion in 2007.12 A record amount of 
$92.5 billion flowed into emerging market funds in 2010.13 
In many regards, these emerging countries have even benefited 
from the recent financial crisis. The BRICs’ contribution to global 
growth has risen to forty-five percent since the beginning of the 
financial crisis in 2007, up from twenty-four percent in the years 2000–
2006.14 The stagnant U.S. economy contributed to the trend towards 
international diversification.15 The economic downturn in the U.S. has 
reduced the number of available private equity deals, thus requiring 
firms to look for targets globally in order to compete successfully and 
deliver expected returns.16 
Private equity in emerging markets not only benefits investors from 
developed countries; it can also have substantial benefits for a 
developing market economy and the businesses operating therein. Often, 
private equity bridges the gap in corporate financing needed for growth, 
offering a mature business an alternative between costly debt financing 
and an Initial Public Offering (“IPO”).17 Additionally, a private equity 
firm will often provide experienced management teams18, and in the 
event of an investment exit through an IPO on an international 
exchange, the private equity backing allows the target initial access to 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. 
 13. Alison Tudor, Baring Raises $2.46 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2011, 10:17 
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870344590457611754310047953 
6.html. 
 14. See JIM O’NEILL & ANNA STUPNYTSKA, GOLDMAN SACHS, GLOBAL ECON. 
PAPER NO: 192, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR THE BRICS AND N-11 POST CRISIS 6 
(2009), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/topics/brics/brics-repo 
rts-pdfs/long-term-outlook.pdf. 
 15. See Chris Snow, The Credit Crisis of 2008: Impact of Credit Crisis on Private 
Equity Markets, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 71, 74 (2008). 
 16. See Thomas W. France, Seeing Beyond the Cycle: Understanding the Long- 
and Short-Term Effects of the Economic Downturn, in PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE 
CAPITAL TRENDS IN A TURBULENT ECONOMY: LEADING LAWYERS ON DEVELOPING 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES, EVALUATING NEW GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES, AND ANALYZING 
SHORT- AND LONG-TERM MARKET CHANGES *3 (2009). 
 17. See DAVID P. STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE 
FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY 342 (2010). 
 18. See id. at 325. 
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international capital markets.19 The increase in liquidity in the domestic 
capital markets of a developing country through foreign investment also 
reduces the cost of raising capital domestically.20 It encourages other 
domestic and foreign issuers to come to the capital markets, thereby 
creating further liquidity.21 
Expectations were not realized, however, during the first surge of 
emerging markets private equity in the mid-1990s. Returns were often 
even lower than those of comparable funds in the United States and 
Europe, despite the significantly higher risks involved.22 As a result, 
emerging markets private equity funds had difficulty raising funds at the 
turn of the century.23 Leeds and Sunderland name three principal reasons 
for the initial underperformance. First, targets in emerging markets often 
suffered under low corporate governance standards, including a low 
level of accountability resulting in high agency costs.24 Second,  many 
private equity funds found legal recourse limited as key contractual 
protections were unenforceable in the jurisdictions where they made 
their investments.25 Third, domestic capital markets could not offer the 
necessary liquidity to allow for high return IPO exits, and international 
capital markets proved to be a realistic option only for the largest 
companies of developing countries.26 
This Article will analyze the current legal and political environment 
faced by private equity funds investing in the BRICs. In what ways have 
the BRICs embraced the potential benefits offered by foreign private 
equity investment and created a more investment-friendly framework 
that can explain the exponential growth in emerging markets private 
equity over the past decade? To answer this question, this Article will 
first briefly outline the private equity life cycle and describe the 
difficulties faced in each stage when applied to an emerging market 
environment, from the investment until the exit (Section II). Then, this 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See, e.g., KPMG, HOW YOU CAN ACCESS THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET 
(2007), available at http://www.kpmg.com.cn/en/virtual_library/Private_equity/How_y 
ou_can_access_PE_market.pdf. 
 20. Christopher J. Mailander, Searching for Liquidity: United States Exit Strategies 
for International Private Equity Investment, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 71, 79 (1997). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 111. 
 23. Id. at 114. 
 24. Id. at 114–15. 
 25. Id. at 115. 
 26. Id. at 115–16. 
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Article will analyze the legal and economic conditions relevant to 
private equity in each of the four BRICs (Section III). In this context, 
the objective is not to provide an exhaustive treatise of all relevant 
aspects corporate counsel has to consider when advising a private equity 
firm investing in the BRICs, but rather to lay the foundation for a 
comparison of the investment climate for private equity in the four 
countries, which will provide insight regarding the key drivers for 
private equity growth (Section IV). 
I. THE PRIVATE EQUITY LIFE CYCLE AND DIFFICULTIES WHEN 
INVESTING IN EMERGING MARKETS 
A private equity investment—the private placement of money in a 
business venture27—can take very different forms, such as a leveraged 
buyout (“LBO”), growth capital, mezzanine lending, and venture 
capital.28 LBOs are less common in emerging markets private equity 
investments compared to the U.S. private equity market, due to less 
available leverage29 and foreign direct investment (“FDI”) restrictions 
limiting foreign investors to certain percentages of the target’s 
outstanding shares.30 Emerging markets also pose certain challenges to 
the potential for traditional venture capital investments. Among such 
challenges can be the lack of trained local talent and infrastructure and 
weak protection of intellectual property.31 The inherent risk of venture 
capital may be increased by the market circumstances to a degree that 
renders the investment inadvisable. Thus, growth capital investments are 
most common and, interestingly, also produce higher returns in 
emerging markets.32 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See, e.g., José Raúl Alcántar & David W. McCombie III, Hispanic Private 
Equity: A Cultural Approach to Achieving Superior Investment Returns, 10 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 233, 235 (2007). 
 28. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 283; see also Steven D. Bortnick & John I. Forry, 
Structuring International Private Equity Investments in the People’s Republic of China, 
126 BANKING L.J. 195, 196 (2009). 
 29. Greg Bright, BRICs offer old-fashioned private equity growth, INVESTMENT & 
TECHNOLOGY, Mar. 1, 2011, http://www.investmentmagazine.com.au/i-t-news/brics-
offer-old-fashioned-private-equity-growth. 
 30. See infra Part II for foreign direct investment (“FDI”) in the respective BRICs. 
 31. Pacanins, supra note 9. 
 32. See MEERKATT & LIECHTENSTEIN, supra note 8, at 3. 
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Independent from the underlying private equity strategy, the private 
equity lifecycle typically begins with raising funds from end-investors, 
then moves on to identifying and buying into appropriate target 
companies, and ends with an exit that liquidates the investment and 
enables the private equity firm to distribute the returns to the end-
investors.33 In a domestic private equity investment, the most important 
decision is the choice of an appropriate target company. The private 
equity investor will make this decision based on the information it 
receives from possible target companies and its experience in evaluating 
such information.34 However, when investing in an emerging market, 
this decision can follow only after a determination of a proper market to 
invest in. Subsequently, the deal must be structured according to both 
the legal and economic frameworks of the market and the target 
company’s individual situation. Right from the beginning, possible exit 
strategies must be taken into account because they influence the 
structuring of the investment. This is particularly true when investing in 
emerging markets, where the lack of a viable exit strategy is often a 
major concern.35 
This Section will investigate the particular difficulties that a private 
equity investment faces in each of the stages of the private equity life 
cycle. Part A will describe how the legal and economic frameworks of a 
particular country affect the investment decision, as well as the factors 
to be considered when choosing an appropriate target. Part B will 
discuss the deal structure and the instruments employed by a private 
equity investor to ensure its returns. Finally, Part C will illustrate the 
different means of exiting a private equity investment in an emerging 
market. 
A. DUE DILIGENCE: CHOOSING MARKET AND TARGET 
At the outset, a private equity investor has to decide which 
particular market it wishes to invest in. Numerous factors pose a 
particular challenge to private equity investment in emerging markets, 
and these factors can vary substantially depending on the individual 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See Mailander, supra note 20, at 75–77; see also Wei Shen, China’s Dilemma: 
How Can a Weak Company Law Regime Support a Strong Market for International 
Private Equity Investments? A Real ‘Piggybacking’ Case, 11 BUS. L. INT’L. 195, 196–
97 (2010). 
 34. Mailander, supra note 20, at 76. 
 35. See id at 78. 
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market. Risks to be considered include currency fluctuation, political 
instability, liquidity, accounting, tax, and volatility of capital markets.36 
Thus, private equity funds typically focus on a particular market in order 
to ensure that managers have the required expertise, as well as to offer 
investors the required risk profile. 
1. Choosing the Market 
There are several aspects that are particularly important when 
choosing an appropriate market. The first of these is the quality of the 
legal system and its suitability for foreign private equity investment.37 A 
government might restrict access to foreign investment in certain key 
industries or the investment might be subject to government approval, 
the denial of which at a progressed stage of the investment may create 
significant costs. Moreover, the investor must consider how reliable the 
judicial system is in enforcing its rights in the event of a dispute. In this 
context, corruption or bias towards foreign investors may still be a 
potential risk.38 The second concern is the liquidity and functionality of 
the local capital markets. The objective of a private equity investment—
to obtain a higher return after a relatively long commitment of capital—
relies on the availability of a profitable exit. When lack of liquidity or 
the underdeveloped regulations of capital markets in the domestic 
market bar access to an IPO in the domestic market, the investor must 
resort to alternative exit strategies that may require more preparation and 
offer substantially less certain returns.39 
Part III of this Article will scrutinize these legal and economic 
factors in the BRIC countries to determine their suitability for foreign 
private equity investment. 
2. Choosing the Target 
Once the appropriate market has been determined, the investor 
must identify an appropriate target company. Unlike in the U.S. private 
equity market, where investors often receive offers for potential targets, 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See STOWELL, supra note 17, at 143. 
 37. See Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 115. 
 38. See Pacanins, supra note 9. 
 39. See Mailander, supra note 20, at 108; Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 
115. Alternative exit strategies will be discussed in Part C of this section. 
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the investor must assume a more proactive role in identifying and 
selecting suitable targets.40 In doing so, an investor should establish a 
local base of operations in order to generate the necessary market 
intelligence and learn of new investment opportunities, which are often 
communicated through well-connected business and social circles.41 An 
“ideal” target company should have highly qualified and motivated 
management because the high leverage employed in a buyout does not 
leave much room for error in the future operation of the company.42 
Where a private equity firm provides growth capital, problems can arise 
particularly in family-run companies when management resists the 
influence of the financial investor.43 Moreover, a target company should 
have a substantial and stable cash flow to service the new debt, low 
leverage at the outside, as well as suitable assets that can be used as 
collateral for the debt to be incurred.44 Determining whether a potential 
target satisfies these requirements can be difficult in practice. Where 
sound financial and operating information is not available, it becomes 
almost impossible to evaluate a target company accurately during the 
due diligence process.45 Even if financial statements are available, it can 
be difficult to assess their accuracy when they are not independently 
audited or based on accepted financial accounting standards.46 
B. MAKING THE INVESTMENT 
When a suitable target has been identified, the private equity 
investor moves on to negotiate and consummate the deal. The structure 
of the deal depends largely on the investment strategy. In a LBO, the 
private equity firm will take control of the target company by the 
purchase of all or most of the company’s equity.47 Thus, the LBO 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Pacanins, supra note 9; Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 117. 
 41. Pacanins, supra note 9; see Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 116 (naming 
the reluctance of private equity funds to establish local operations as a major reason for 
the disappointing performance of private equity in emerging markets in the 1990s). 
 42. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 285. 
 43. Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 114; see also Érica Gorga, Culture and 
Corporate Law Reform: A Case Study of Brazil, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 803, 813 
(2006). 
 44. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 285. 
 45. Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 114. 
 46. Id. 
 47. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 284. 
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investor will be less concerned with ensuring additional control rights 
than a minority investor.48 The focus in a buyout lies on ensuring that 
the target can meet its debt obligations, and on aligning management 
incentives with those of the investor.49 In a growth capital scenario, 
however, the private equity firm will take only a minority position in 
order to provide capital to the target company without a change of 
control.50 A minority position translates to a higher risk and the private 
equity investor will seek to ensure its return through the use of 
convertible equity or debt.51 Depending on the market, these instruments 
may not be available, or at least not to the same extent, in developing 
countries.52 Moreover, the investor will seek to gain influence over the 
target company’s management through control rights.53 Such control 
rights usually include, among others, anti-dilution clauses, tag-along 
clauses and supermajority provisions.54 Therefore, the enforceability of 
such control rights in the event of a dispute is of extreme importance for 
a growth capital investor.55 When private equity firms are faced with 
less efficient legal enforcement, they usually prefer majority ownership 
and more board representation over contractual rights.56 However, where 
majority ownership is prevented by restrictions on foreign investment or 
the lack of available financing, the reliability of the local judicial system 
becomes again a major concern.57 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Buyouts: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY, http://us.practicallaw.com/4-
381-1368?q=buyouts%20overview. 
 49. Id. 
 50. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 283. 
 51. Minority Investments: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY, http://us.practial 
law.com/ 1-422-1158?q=minority%20investments%20overview [hereinafter Minority 
Investments: Overview] 
 52. See infra Part II, for the availability of financial instruments in each of the 
BRICs. 
 53. Minority Investments: Overview, supra note 51. 
 54. See Cinthia Daniela Bertan Ribeiro, Financial Contracting Choices in Brazil: 
Does the Brazilian Legal Environment Allow Private Equity Groups to Enter Into 
Complex Contractual Arrangements With Brazilian Companies?, 13 L. & BUS. REV. 
AM. 355, 368-69 (2007), for a description of these control rights. 
 55. See STOWELL, supra note 17, at 361. 
 56. Ribeiro, supra note 54, at 370 (citing Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Does 
Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private 
Equity, 120 Q. J. ECON. 223, 224-25 (2005)). 
 57. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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Another major determinant in the structure of a private equity 
transaction is tax efficiency. Private equity firms will often incorporate 
holding companies in one or more offshore jurisdictions in order to take 
advantage of tax havens and beneficial tax treaties.58 Such tax 
considerations are complex and independent from the general legal, 
economic and political environment of private equity investments and 
are thus beyond the scope of this Article. 
C. EXITING THE INVESTMENT 
The exit enables the private equity fund to liquidate its investment 
and distribute the returns to its investors. Consequently, the exit 
determines the return for the investors and is therefore quintessential for 
a successful private equity investment.59 
The most profitable way of exiting a private equity investment is 
usually by way of an IPO on a domestic exchange.60 Thus, private equity 
investment is most attractive where liquid and developed capital markets 
enable the investor to take the target company public. A major concern 
about emerging markets traditionally has been that capital markets are 
either not sufficiently liquid or lack the required regulatory 
infrastructure.61 However, the BRICs, especially Brazil and China, have 
taken significant steps to increase the liquidity and attractiveness of their 
domestic capital markets.62 
When a domestic IPO does not promise to achieve the required 
result, the listing of shares on an exchange in a developed market offers 
an important alternative. Traditionally, the U.S. has been the primary 
market for foreign listings due to its high liquidity and receptiveness for 
foreign companies.63 Even though the majority of global IPOs are now 
conducted outside the U.S., listings in the U.S. still amounted to 31% of 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See, e.g., Bortnick & Forry, supra note 28, at 198-99. 
 59. See id. at 197-98. 
 60. Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 115. 
 61. Id.; Pacanins, supra note 9. 
 62. See infra Part II, for an analysis of the BRIC capital markets. 
 63. Mailander, supra note 20, at 80. But see Christopher J. Mailander, Tempering a 
Chill on Skittish Capital Markets: Illiquid Investments in the Wake of Global Volatility, 
13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 379, 384-85 (1997) (pointing out that U.S. investors have 
proven to be more receptive to offerings by foreign issuers from developed countries 
rather than those from emerging markets). 
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all IPOs launched in 2008.64 In order to free potential investors from 
possible currency risk and limitations on the investment in foreign 
securities, offerings of foreign companies in the U.S. are usually 
executed through the issue of American Depository Receipts 
(“ADRs”).65 Shares of the foreign issuer are deposited with a U.S. bank, 
which issues dollar-denominated ADRs that represent the underlying 
shares.66 The U.S. depository bank is also responsible for collecting 
share dividends from the issuer and distributing them to the holders of 
ADRs, converted into U.S. dollars.67 An ADR issue does not necessarily 
need to be listed on an exchange and registered with the SEC. A listing 
on an over-the-counter market or a private placement exempt from the 
registration requirements is also possible and can significantly reduce 
the costs and potential liabilities associated with registration under the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.68 These options may be 
particularly attractive for companies from emerging markets.69 Despite 
its lower liquidity, this market now appears to be the predominant means 
for foreign companies to raise capital in the U.S.70 The difficulties faced 
when offering in the U.S. market will, however, require the private 
equity firm to play an active role and assist the portfolio company in the 
preparation and execution of the exit.71 Also, a listing on an exchange in 
a developed market may only be realistic for large companies in the 
emerging market with sufficient visibility to attract foreign investors.72 
If a public offering does not appear feasible either domestically or 
abroad, the private equity firm can exit the investment through a private 
sale. Such a sale can be to a strategic buyer or to a later stage financial 
investor. Companies in emerging markets that received foreign private 
                                                                                                                 
 64. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 146-47. 
 65. Mailander, supra note 20, at 83. See S. Eric Wang, Investing Abroad: 
Regulation S and U.S. Retail Investment in Foreign Securities, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. 
REV. 329 (2002), for a discussion of Regulation S restricting U.S. investment in foreign 
securities. 
 66. Mailander, supra note 20, at 83; STOWELL, supra note 17, at 151. 
 67. Mailander, supra note 20, at 84. 
 68. Id. at 99. 
 69. Id. at 105-07. 
 70. HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND 
REGULATION 52 (Foundation Press 17th ed. 2010). 
 71. Mailander, supra note 20, at 108. 
 72. Robert D. Stillman, Alternative Exit Strategies for International Private Equity, 
13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 133, 134 (1997). 
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equity investment can present attractive opportunities for strategic 
buyers from developed countries because the private equity investor 
often will have introduced internationally accepted accounting standards 
and more efficient management structures.73 Thus, when a private equity 
firm invests significant resources to add value by making operations and 
management more efficient, sales to strategic buyers have the potential 
to achieve similar returns as public offerings.74 Otherwise, however, 
private sales tend not to achieve the same returns as public offerings.75 
In addition, it may be difficult to limit the seller’s liabilities in regard to 
the portfolio company. Because of the private equity firm’s objective to 
exit the investment entirely, such limitations on liability may have to be 
bought by way of a lower purchase price. Thus, it is important for the 
private equity firm to consider the likelihood of a private sale at the 
outset when making the investment. Potentially, the lack of a viable exit 
strategy renders an otherwise attractive investment opportunity 
infeasible. 
 
II. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR  
PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE BRICS 
 
The previous section carved out the challenges generally faced by a 
private equity firm when investing in an emerging market. This section 
will look in more detail at the legal and economic environment for 
private equity in the four leading emerging markets: Brazil, Russia, 
India and China.76 It is important to note, however, that these four 
countries cannot be understood as being representative of the larger 
geographical market they are located in. Especially in Asia, regulatory 
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regimes differ significantly between China and other Asian markets, 
such as Japan or Southeast Asia. 
In order to make the observations somewhat comparable, certain 
legal and economic aspects relevant to private equity will be 
investigated for each of the four countries. These include the treatment 
of FDI as the entry barrier for foreign investors, the law applicable to 
takeovers of public targets (public to private transactions), corporate law 
and the enforcement of contractual rights, and finally, potential exit 
strategies—in particular the strength of the domestic IPO market. 
A. BRAZIL 
In 2010, Brazil’s GDP increased by 7.5% compared to the previous 
year, representing the highest level of growth since 1986.77 In 2009, the 
GDP had reached about $1.5 trillion, making Brazil the eighth largest 
economy in the world.78 Growth slowed to 2.7% in 2011,79 indicating 
that Brazil did not remain unaffected by a sluggish economy worldwide. 
However, this did not affect the growth of FDI, which amounted to 
$66.7 billion in 2011, up from $48.5 billion in 2010.80 Brazil was 
forecasted to attract $45 billion in foreign direct investment in 2010, 
which would mean a 74% increase from 2009.81 Even during the 
financial crisis, the private equity industry in Brazil has performed 
comparably well. After a record year in 2007 with investments of $5.3 
billion, investments dropped to $3 billion in 2008 and $1 billion in 2009, 
returning to the 2006 level, but rebounding strongly in 2010 to $4.6 
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billion.82 In large part, this seems due to the fact that Brazilian private 
equity investments rely to a much lesser extent on leverage.83 Deals with 
less than 50% equity are rare, and many deals are even made with 100% 
equity.84 
Taking in private equity capital in the form of growth capital (25% 
to 30%) prior to an IPO is a common strategy for family-run Brazilian 
businesses.85 A favorable legal regulatory environment combined with a 
large number of companies suitable for private equity investment 
contributes to a favorable climate for the private equity industry.86 In 
response to the growing opportunities in Brazil, several foreign private 
equity firms, such as Carlyle and Actis, have opened offices in Brazil 
over the past few years.87 
1. Foreign Direct Investment 
A preliminary concern for every private equity firm investing 
abroad, but especially for those looking for potential buyout targets, is a 
country’s regulation of FDI. FDI regulation generally either bars FDI 
entirely in certain strategic sectors or limits it to a specific percentage of 
a company’s outstanding stock.88 
In Brazil, three government authorities are responsible for the 
regulation of FDI. The National Monetary Council (“CMN”) establishes 
the general rules concerning the registration of foreign investments.89 
The Central Bank of Brazil (“BACEN”), among other tasks, controls the 
foreign exchange markets and executes the rules established by CMN.90 
The Brazilian Security and Exchange Commission (“CVM”) is 
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responsible for foreign investor activities on the Brazilian capital 
markets.91 
Investments in non-regulated sectors can be made without any prior 
authorization or license and are generally treated the same way as 
domestic investments.92 Invested capital can be remitted freely once it 
has been registered with BACEN.93 BACEN does not have the authority 
to determine whether a certain investment is “desirable” or deny 
registration because of an adverse effect on the Brazilian economy.94 
Foreign investment in Brazilian companies is entirely prohibited 
only as it concerns the following activities: (1) exploring, exploiting, 
and selling radioactive minerals and its by-products; (2) health services; 
(3) business located on international borders; and (4) post office 
services.95 Foreign investment is limited to 30% ownership of an entity 
operating newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals, as well as radio 
and television broadcasters,96 and 20% ownership in airlines with 
concessions for domestic flight routes.97 
2. Takeovers of Public Targets 
Takeover law is relevant for a private equity investor who plans to 
buy out a public company and take it private. In this case, a private 
equity investor has to make a mandatory public offering (“OPA”) for 
acquisition or exchange of securities under Brazilian law.98 The OPA 
must (1) be launched by the company’s controlling shareholder or the 
company itself; (2) be aimed at the acquisition of all outstanding shares; 
and (3) achieve the tender by at least two-thirds of the free float.99 The 
statute mandates a floor for the share price offered in the OPA, which 
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includes a certain premium over the share price.100 Should the acquirer 
obtain 95% or more of the outstanding shares through the OPA, the 
remaining shareholders can be squeezed out for the same price.101 
A mandatory OPA is triggered when an entity acquires a 
controlling interest in a public corporation.102 The CVM determines 
whether a controlling interest was acquired on a case-by-case basis and 
not solely on the percentage of stock acquired. In particular, a purchase 
of stock may be held to be an acquisition of a controlling interest when 
the acquirer, through a shareholders’ agreement, prevails at 
shareholders’ meetings and is able to elect a majority of the board.103 
Thus, even a private equity firm investing in growth capital may run the 
risk of being subjected to a mandatory OPA and should therefore 
carefully structure its investment so as not to be held to have acquired a 
controlling interest in the target company. 
An investor who resides, is domiciled or has its head offices outside 
Brazil needs to appoint both a representative and a custodian in 
Brazil.104 The custodian for the foreign investor’s investment in Brazil 
must be authorized by BACEN and CVM.105 
3. Corporate Law and Enforcement of Contractual Rights 
The main legal entities used in Brazil are the limited liability 
company (sociedade limitada) and the corporation (sociedade 
anônima).106 Structuring the investment as a limited liability company 
offers simplicity and flexibility in the corporate structure, lower 
maintenance costs and fewer legal formalities compared to a 
corporation.107 However, only a corporation can issue securities or 
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become a publicly held company.108 Thus, if the private equity firm 
aspires to exit the investment through an IPO, it must either structure the 
target as a corporation from the beginning or convert the limited liability 
company into a corporation at a later stage. 
a. Corporate Governance 
The Brazilian Corporation Law sets only minimum standards of 
corporate governance.109 Mainly, the corporate governance standards of 
Brazilian corporations are influenced by the segment of the Brazilian 
stock exchange BOVESPA on which the company is listed or may 
aspire to become listed in the future. Law No. 10.303/01 (Oct. 31, 2001) 
created three corporate governance levels for listing on BOVESPA110 in 
order to enhance the valuation of companies’ securities and attract 
investors to the market by strengthening transparency and confidence in 
the stock market.111  
In order to obtain a listing on one of these three segments, the 
corporation must voluntarily abide by higher corporate governance and 
disclosure requirements than those mandated by general Brazilian 
corporate law.112 The lowest level of corporate governance out of these 
three segments is mandated by Nivel 1. The issuer must (1) ensure that 
at least 25% of the issuer’s shares are in free float; (2) conduct public 
offerings in a way that promotes widespread ownership; (3) provide 
quarterly disclosures; (4) comply with stricter disclosure requirements in 
regard to insider transactions; (5) file shareholder agreements and stock 
option plans with BOVESPA; and (6) make a schedule of corporate 
events available to shareholders.113 In addition to the Nivel 1 
requirements, a Nivel 2 issuer must: (1) grant tagalong rights for all 
shareholders in the event of a transfer of control; (2) grant voting rights 
to holders of preferred stock for certain corporate restructurings; (3) 
establish a board of directors that has at least five members and that 
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requires 1/5 of the board to be comprised of independent (outside) 
directors; (4) prepare annual financial statements in English and in 
compliance with U.S. GAAP or IFRS; and (5) agree to arbitration for 
disputes between the corporation and its shareholders.114  
Finally, to obtain a listing on the Novo Mercado, in addition to 
complying with all Nivel 1 and Nivel 2 requirements, the issuer must 
issue only common shares.115 At first, the market did not respond as 
expected to the new segments with enhanced corporate governance 
levels, with only two companies listed on Novo Mercado, three on Nivel 
2, and 31 on Nivel 1.116 This began to change, however, in 2004 and 
now 126 companies are listed on Novo Mercado, 19 on Nivel 2, and 32 
on Nivel 1.117 230 companies are still listed on the traditional 
BOVESPA segment.118 Research by Érica Gorga showed that young 
companies and first-time issuers constitute the vast majority of 
companies listed on Novo Mercado, whereas older, established 
companies are reluctant to migrate to higher levels of corporate 
governance.119 While most private equity firms invest in non-public 
targets that do not yet need to comply with Novo Mercado’s high 
corporate governance standards, the prospect of a future listing may 
already induce companies to adhere to certain governance practices at an 
earlier stage. The evidence from the Novo Mercado listings seems to 
suggest that management of younger companies in particular are more 
willing to subject themselves to stricter corporate governance best 
practices. 
One particular concern when investing in Brazilian companies is 
the often concentrated ownership. Research by Sílvia Mourthé 
Valadares and Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal found that in 2000, 62.5% 
in a sample of 325 companies were controlled by a single shareholder 
who owned, on average, 74% of the voting shares, and even firms 
without a single majority shareholder were often controlled by three 
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major shareholders.120 Significant agency problems can occur because 
controlling shareholders may tend to extract value from the company at 
the expense of minority shareholders.121 Such private benefits do not 
necessarily have to be pecuniary. In Brazil, the prestige that comes with 
the control of a company can be an important factor, especially when the 
company has always been in control of the management’s family.122 An 
entrepreneur who has built a business without the need of outside 
capital, and thus without accountability to others, may be difficult to 
convince to keep personal and business accounts separate and maintain 
proper records.123 Yet a private equity investor must often rely on the 
experience and expertise of the incumbent management to run the target 
company. Thus, the accountability of the target’s management must be 
carefully evaluated during the due diligence process and an investment, 
despite substantial growth opportunity, should not be made where the 
tension between family management and the outside investor cannot be 
overcome. 
b. Enforcement of Contractual Rights 
A private equity firm that takes only a minority position in the 
target company as part of its growth capital strategy must be able to rely 
on contractual provisions (control rights) that protect its investment.124 
Brazilian law explicitly permits the use of different classes of shares 
with different rights conferred to each class,125 thus enabling a flexible 
deal structure. Shareholder agreements governing the purchase and sale 
of shares, preemptive rights and the exercise of voting rights, are 
enforceable against third parties as long as they are filed with the 
corporation.126 The sale of a shareholder’s right to vote constitutes a 
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crime under Brazilian law and can therefore be the subject of neither a 
shareholder agreement nor a bylaw.127 
However, developing countries with a civil law origin like Brazil 
are believed to offer a low level of contractual protections and 
enforcement to private equity investors.128 The Brazilian court system 
tends to operate very slowly,129 and the right of parties to appeal a 
judgment continually delays obtaining a final judgment significantly.130 
In addition, there are not enough courts and judges to handle the many 
and diverse cases that arise.131 Lastly, there is no system of precedent as 
in common law legal systems, which impedes the ability to assess the 
likelihood of success in litigation.132 
Despite this less than favorable framework, Cinthia Daniela Bertan 
Ribeiro has found in her study that private equity and venture capital 
investors are increasingly open to minority positions and employ all of 
the protective control rights usually found in private equity 
investments.133 She explains this phenomena in part with the fact that 
private equity firms base their decision on the quality of the target and 
the relationship with the target’s management: through detailed due 
diligence and substantial efforts to develop a functioning relationship 
with management, disputes, and thus the necessity to rely on the 
contractual protections in court, can be avoided.134 Another, and 
probably more important, reason is the broad use of arbitration in private 
equity investment.135 The Brazilian Arbitration Law was passed in 1996 
and established clear rules supporting arbitration in Brazil.136 The parties 
can avoid the delay and lack of expertise of the Brazilian courts by 
selecting well-qualified arbitrators and restricting the right to appeal the 
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arbitral award.137 The Brazilian Supreme Court in 2001 held the 
Arbitration Act to be constitutional, and arbitration clauses are now 
widely used in private equity agreements with Brazilian firms and often 
select Brazil-based arbitral tribunals that belong to Brazilian institutions 
(e.g., Sao Paulo’s stock exchange BOVESPA) or international chambers 
of commerce.138  
4. Exiting from the Brazilian Investment 
The capital market reforms beginning in 2001 have had a 
substantial effect on Brazil’s IPO market. From 2003 to 2008, 103 IPOs 
were conducted on the Brazilian capital markets, accompanied by 95 
secondary public offerings.139 In the record year of 2007, 64 companies 
raised $33.3 billion in IPOs.140 While the Brazilian IPO market did not 
escape the consequences of the financial crisis, with only 4 IPOs in 
2008, 6 in 2009, and 11 in 2010, it rebounded  in 2011 with 22 IPOs.141 
The overwhelming majority of IPOs has been listed on Novo Mercado. 
In 2007 alone, 41 out of the 64 companies conducting an IPO listed on 
Novo Mercado, compared to 7 on Nivel 2, and 8 on Nivel 1.142 These 
numbers show that Novo Mercado provides an excellent exit 
opportunity for private equity investors who, during the term of the 
investment, improve corporate governance and reporting standards in 
order to comply with the high Novo Mercado standards. Additionally, 
commitment to a high corporatate government level has a positive effect 
on share value,143 which might lead to higher returns for private equity 
investors.  
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In order to conduct a public offering in Brazil, as a general rule, 
both the issuer and the offering itself must be registered with CVM, and 
an intermediary must be responsible for distribution, clearing and 
settlement.144 An offering is deemed to be public if any sales efforts are 
conducted in Brazil that target the “general public,” or if Brazilian 
investors have access to the offering information and no precautions 
have been taken to prevent such access.145 “General public” means “a 
class, category, or group of people, even if individualized, either 
resident, domiciled, or incorporated in Brazil, except for those having 
close, regular, and prior commercial, credit, corporate, or labor relations 
with the issuer.”146 In 2009, the CVM promulgated an exemption for 
small offerings targeted at no more than 50 qualified investors,147 but 
only if no more than 20 such qualified investors subscribe, and all 
material information is disclosed without the need of a formal 
prospectus.148 However, equity securities are excluded from this 
exemption.149 
If a Brazilian corporation wishes to offer depository receipts 
abroad, it must be publicly held and receive authorization from CVM 
and BACEN.150 The securities underlying the receipts must be stored 
with a depository in Brazil.151 
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B. RUSSIA 
Among the BRIC countries, Russia suffered the most from the 
financial crisis. Russia’s GDP dropped by 7.9% in 2009, making it only 
the twelfth largest economy (after being the eighth in 2008).152 For this 
reason, commentators have questioned whether Russia still belongs in 
the BRIC. An article published in Forbes Magazine argued that Russia’s 
overdependence on the oil and gas market was exposed when the oil 
bubble burst in mid-2008.153 The article further held that corruption, 
government interference in the private sector and the erosion of civil 
liberties are reasons why Russia has performed poorly through the 
financial crisis compared to the other BRIC countries, and that these 
factors will continue to impede growth in Russia in the future.154 
However, unlike in the financial crisis of 1998, big banks and 
companies remained intact, and Russia still has the third largest foreign 
currency reserves.155 Goldman Sachs’ Jim O’Neill opined in 2009 that, 
while Russia’s performance was disappointing in the financial crisis, it 
deserves its place in the BRIC if it recovers quickly.156 One such 
indicator may be that Russian stocks increased by 20% in 2010, the 
largest gain among the BRIC countries.157 Growth rates of 4.3% in both 
2010 and 2011 also indicate Russia’s recovery.158 
The macroeconomic picture in Russia is mirrored by the 
development of the private equity industry. While total private equity 
investment rose by more than 300% from $0.8 billion in 2007 to $2.6 
billion in 2008, it dropped dramatically in 2009 to only $0.2 million, 
below the 2004 level.159 Unlike in the other BRIC countries, private 
equity investment did not recover fully to the 2008 level in 2010.160 
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1. Foreign Direct Investment 
FDI into Russia was impacted significantly by the financial crisis. 
After rising to $75 billion from 2004 until 2008, it cut in half to $36.8 
billion in 2009 and recovered only to a small degree in 2010.161 
FDI in Russia is regulated by the Law No. 160-FZ, July 9, 1999, 
On Foreign Investment in the Russian Federation162 (“Foreign 
Investment Law”) and Law No. 57-FZ, April 29, 2008, On Foreign 
Investment in Business Entities of Strategic Importance for National 
Defense and National Security (“Strategic Entities Law”).163 The 
Foreign Investment Law defines FDI as “the acquisition by a foreign 
investor of at least 10 per cent stake . . . in the . . . capital of a 
commercial organization” and restricts FDI based on the “protection of 
fundamental constitutional principles, morality, health, or the rights and 
legal interests of others, or to provide for the defense of the country and 
security of the state.”164 While the Foreign Investment Law left foreign 
investors with a lot of uncertainty about when the government would 
invoke its authority to restrict FDI,165 the new Strategic Entities Law 
now names 42 areas in which FDI is restricted where such investment 
leads to the establishment of direct or indirect control.166 Among the 
“strategic entities” are those that operate in, for example, nuclear 
energy, intelligence operations, certain activities in aviation and 
aerospace, radio and television broadcasting, as well as the publication 
of printed periodicals.167 A foreign investor168 seeking to invest in a 
                                                                                                                 
 161. U.S. & FOREIGN COM. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA: 
A COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FOR U.S. COMPANIES, CH. 6, § OPENNESS TO FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT (2012) [hereinafter USFCS Russia]. 
 162. Jesse Heath, Strategic Protectionism? National Security and Foreign 
Investment in the Russian Federation, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 465, 478, n.103 
(2009). 
 163. Natalia Drebezgina, Overview of Regulations Applicable to Mergers and 
Acquisitions in the Russian Federation, in DOING DEALS IN EMERGING MARKETS: BRIC 
& BEYOND 2010 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1826, 2010). 
 164. Heath, supra note 162, at 478-79 (citing Law on Foreign Investment in the 
Russian Federation arts. 2, 4-15, No. 160-FZ, July 9, 1999). 
 165. Id. at 479. 
 166. Drebezgina, supra note 163, at 179. 
 167. Id. at 170 n.11; for a more detailed list, see Heath, supra note 162, at 484-86. 
 168. Marat Altynbaev, Investments in the Russian Federation, in CORPORATE 
COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA § 18:1 (Tomi P. Asanti et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 2010) (“[A] foreign investor is: a foreign legal entity the civil legal capacity of 
 
1332 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
“strategic entity” must obtain approval from the Federal Anti-Monopoly 
Service (“FAS”) and the Government Commission on Foreign 
Investment.169 A foreign entity can be held to establish control through 
various means, including (1) the acquisition of more than 50% of the 
target’s voting stock, or a lesser percentage if this is sufficient to 
exercise control; (2) the right to appoint the CEO, or more than half of 
the target’s management or board of directors; or (3) the performance of 
management duties by the foreign investor.170 
Though the new Strategic Entities Law appears to be restrictive, 
commentators point to the improved clarity and transparency resulting 
from the legislation.171 However, legislation can be only as good as its 
implementation, an area in which Russia still needs substantial 
improvement.172 The Russian government has announced that it plans to 
ease access to certain sectors in 2011, including food, pharmaceutical, 
banking and natural resources sectors.173 
2. Takeovers of Public Targets 
An investor who acquires more than 30% of a Russian open joint 
stock company (“OJSC”), the equivalent of a publicly held 
corporation,174 is required to make a mandatory tender offer (“MTO”) to 
the remaining shareholders.175 A tender offer aimed at acquiring more 
than 30% of the target’s stock must be made by way of a voluntary 
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 169. Heath, supra note 162, at 486. 
 170. Drebezgina, supra note 163, at 182. 
 171. See Heath, supra note 162, at 494. 
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 174. See infra Part II.B.3. 
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tender offer (“VTO”).176 Both MTO and VTO must be accompanied by 
extensive documentation regarding the offer, and the minimum purchase 
price is determined based on the historic trading price and/or the price 
paid in previous acquisitions.177 If the acquirer receives more than 95% 
of the target’s stock in the MTO or VTO, the acquirer may squeeze out 
the remaining minority shareholders, and the shareholders have the right 
to request the acquirer to purchase their shares.178 
3. Corporate Law and Legal Enforcement 
The most common forms of legal entities used in Russia are the 
limited liability company (“LLC”) and the joint stock company 
(“JSC”).179 A JSC can be organized as an OJSC, a public corporation 
with usually a large shareholder base, or as a closed joint stock 
corporation (“CJSC”), which must have 50 shareholders or less.180 
Unlike an OJSC, a CJSC cannot conduct a public offering of its shares 
and shareholders have a preemptive right to purchase shares sold by 
other shareholders of the CJSC (right of first refusal).181 In return, a 
CJSC is subject to less stringent disclosure requirements than an 
OJSC.182 Consequently, it may be preferable for a private equity investor 
to organize the target company as a CJSC upon investment in order to 
reduce regulatory costs. Moreover, the right of first refusal protects a 
private equity investor who takes a minority position against dilution. 
Should the investor wish to exit by way of an IPO, however, the target 
would need to be converted into an OJSC. 
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a. Corporate Governance 
Quick privatization of former state-owned enterprises has led to a 
high ownership concentration in Russian companies.183 Studies found 
that about 40% of the Russian industry is controlled by only 22 business 
groups, which themselves are in the hands of “oligarchs.”184 
Consequently, conflicts generally do not arise between shareholders and 
management, but rather between controlling and minority 
shareholders.185 In a survey by C5 and Squire, Sanders & Dempsey 
L.L.P., a majority of those surveyed named untrustworthy partners in the 
target companies as the primary reason for writing off deals.186 The 
combination of high ownership concentration and weak legal institutions 
increases the value of control, making a LBO more desirable.187 Buyouts 
by private equity firms, however, remain rare due to the lack of 
necessary leverage.188 
Another “layer” of conflict is added by the growing trend of 
government influence in private businesses to the extent that 
representatives of regional and local government authorities are included 
on the companies’ boards.189 Regional governments often employ 
provincial protectionism by, for example, interfering with efficient 
restructurings of distressed companies or extracting benefits from large 
local companies in return for protection from creditors and foreign 
competitors.190 
On the upside, low corporate governance in many potential Russian 
target companies offers substantial opportunities for private equity firms 
willing to make the investment to unlock value and thus earn high 
returns. Russian companies are often undervalued and the 
implementation of higher governance standards can achieve a 
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significantly higher valuation.191 How this can be achieved through 
shareholder activism was demonstrated by the Hermitage Fund.192 By 
continuously generating news coverage about corporate governance 
abuses in reputable international media outlets such as The Wall Street 
Journal and The Financial Times, the fund was able to use the 
controlling shareholders’ concern for their international reputation in 
order to invoke corporate governance changes.193 
Since 1996, Russia has amended its corporate law repeatedly in an 
attempt to strengthen minority shareholder rights and attract more 
foreign capital.194 Among the amendments were anti-dilution provisions, 
such as the need for shareholder approval for substantial issues of new 
common stock, as well as governing rights, such as supermajorities, the 
right for 2%-shareholders to propose topics for the shareholders’ 
meeting and the right to include candidates to be elected for the 
corporation’s governing bodies.195 In addition, the amendments provided 
for protection against self-dealing through mandated shareholder 
approval of interested transactions, and for access to the courts in order 
to challenge improper resolutions and to bring claims against the 
directors or managers on behalf of the corporation (derivative action).196 
To compliment the protections afforded in the JSC Law, the FFMS 
introduced a nonbinding Code of Corporate Conduct.197 Among the 
principles laid out in the Code of Corporate Conduct are: (1) effective 
exercise of shareholder rights; (2) equal treatment of shareholders; (3) 
effective control of management by the board of directors, and 
accountability of directors; (4) full and accurate disclosure of 
information about the company; (5) maximization of company value; 
and (6) efficient control over business and financial operations of the 
company.198 
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b. Enforceability of Contractual Rights 
Until recently, a major concern, in particular for private equity 
investors, was the unenforceability of shareholders’ agreements.199 
Private equity firms typically include veto rights, drag along rights, tag 
along rights, and other covenants and warranties in a shareholder’s 
agreement to protect themselves from dilution and to ensure that the 
target company fulfills specific performance benchmarks.200 Under the 
Russian Civil Code, however, only warranties with respect to the shares 
being acquired are enforceable.201 Moreover, a Russian court held in the 
famous Megafon case that shareholders’ agreements were unenforceable 
under Russian law even if the parties agreed on a governing law under 
which such rights would be enforceable.202 In 2009, an amendment to 
JSC Law finally provided for the enforceability of shareholders’ 
agreements. However, the statutory text does not go into much detail 
and significant uncertainties remain.203 In particular, the amendment 
does not afford the parties the right to choose the governing law.204 
Consequently, under Megafon, a choice-of-law clause is still 
unenforceable and the contract will be reviewed under Russian law.205 
Moreover, a shareholders’ agreement is binding only on the parties, and 
not on the corporation.206 Thus, a breach of a shareholders’ agreement 
does not affect the validity of a resolution made by one of the 
corporation’s bodies.207 
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c. Reliability of the Legal System 
While corporate laws are in substance comparable to Western 
standards, implementation and enforcement by Russian authorities 
remain a major concern for foreign investors.208 
Russia’s judiciary faces several challenges. First, Russia’s body of 
law is complex and often conflicting.209 This is exacerbated by the fact 
that the Russian Federation is comprised of 88 subunits, 21 republics, 49 
regions, 10 autonomous districts, 6 territories, Moscow, St. Petersburg 
and 1 autonomous region, each possessing some degree of rule-making 
authority.210 Second, lack of funding in the judiciary causes Russian 
judges to be burdened by a heavy caseload and insufficient training.211 
In response, judges often dismiss cases prematurely for technical 
reasons or make ill-informed decisions on the merits.212 Third, political 
pressure and corruption in the legal system affect judicial decision 
making.213 In addition, U.S. investors are confronted with the fact that 
Russian judges are trained under their civil law system, which results in 
a more literal interpretation of statutes and a lack of firm precedent. 
While this is not limited to Russia, it seems to contribute to U.S. 
investors’ discomfort with the Russian legal system.214 For these 
reasons, private equity firms are well advised to subject their investment 
to international arbitration. International arbitral awards are enforceable 
under Russian law,215 and Russia is also a signatory to the 1958 New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards.216 
Corruption remains a major concern in Russia despite the 
government’s assurance to fight corruption and to create a more 
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favorable investment climate.217 In 2011, the Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index ranked Russia 143rd out of 182 nations, 
down from 90th place in 2004, and Russia came in last out of 54 
countries surveyed in PricewaterhouseCooper’s 2009 Global Economic 
Crime Survey.218 By comparison, the Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index ranks Brazil 73rd, China 75th, and India 
95th.219 
As a result of these concerns, private equity firms generally do not 
invest directly in Russia. Rather, investors use an offshore holding 
company in which both the private equity fund and remaining 
shareholders of the target company invest.220 Primary offshore 
jurisdictions that U.S. investors use when investing in Russia include the 
Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey.221 Aside 
from beneficial tax treatment, such a structure allows investors to 
employ all the incentives and protections usually found in private equity 
investments.222 
4. Exiting from the Russian Investment 
The first IPO on a Russian exchange was conducted in 2002 by 
OAO RBC Information Systems.223 After a slow start to new offerings, 
the market picked up significantly in 2006 and 2007, with about forty 
IPOs in these two years alone.224 However, liquidity remains relatively 
low. Only three state-owned companies provided for over 60% of the 
IPO volume.225 
Equity securities are listed on one of several listing segments, 
depending on the recent trading volume.226 Thus, first-time issuers need 
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to first list on the lowest segments and subsequently transition to higher 
segments once the trading volume is established.227 The listing segment 
determines what type of investors can invest in the securities. For 
example, pension funds and insurance companies may only invest in 
securities listed in the highest listing segment A1.228 Therefore, these 
institutional investors cannot participate in an IPO. 
The majority of Russian initial issuers, however, list their shares on 
foreign exchanges, traditionally on the London Stock Exchange 
(“LSE”).229 Investors in London are relatively familiar with the Russian 
market and there is a track record of Russian issuers who listed on the 
LSE.230 In January 2010, UC Rusal was the first Russian company to 
conduct an IPO on the Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx), potentially 
paving the way for other Russian issuers to follow.231 Ultimately, an IPO 
on a global exchange can only be successful if the issuer can 
demonstrate “quality in all operational areas, quality corporate 
governance, quality information disclosure, quality risk management, 
quality internal controls and quality in all other aspects of their 
business.”232 
Issuers who wish to conduct an IPO abroad (likely through an 
ADR/GDR program) must obtain authorization from the Russian 
Federal Financial Markets Service (“FFMS”). Such authorization is 
granted only if the company has also issued shares on a domestic stock 
exchange and the number of shares issued abroad does not exceed 30% 
of the issuers total same class of shares.233 These requirements were 
introduced in response to the strong preference of Russian issuers to list 
on a foreign exchange.234 The FFMS further limited the percentage of 
shares that can be traded on a foreign exchange in January 2010.235 
However, companies may be able to circumvent these requirements by 
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using a holding company in a foreign jurisdiction.236 This may be a 
viable exit strategy for private equity firms who structure their 
investment through an offshore holding company.237  It is thus argued 
that reforms directed at building trust in the domestic capital markets, 
combined with strict enforcement, would strengthen Russia’s IPO 
market more efficiently.238 
C. INDIA 
India’s economy was affected much less by the financial crisis than 
developed economies. After reporting GDP growth rates between 9.3% 
and 9.6% from 2005 to 2007, growth dropped to 5.1% in 2008, but 
recovered in 2009 to 8.2%.239 In 2010, GDP growth returned to pre-
crisis levels.240 
Private equity investment in India has increased substantially since 
2004 and reached $9.9 billion in 2007, the highest total investment in 
private equity among the BRIC countries.241 After dropping to $4 billion 
in 2009, investments into private companies regained momentum and 
reached $6.2 billion in both 2010 and 2011.242 Due to the relatively 
small capital base of most unlisted Indian companies, investors must 
allow for smaller deal sizes.243 Sectors that need extensive investment in 
infrastructure (such as telecommunications), however, offer larger 
investment opportunities.244 
1. Foreign Direct Investment 
FDI inflows into India have increased exponentially in recent years, 
totaling $43.4 billion in 2008 from $7.6 billion in 2005.245 A series of 
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policy reforms have contributed to an improved environment for foreign 
investors.246 Foreign investment in Indian securities is governed by the 
Foreign Exchange Management Act of 1999 (“FEMA”) and the 
regulations promulgated under it by the Reserve Bank of India 
(“RBI”).247 Investments in Indian equities can be made through two 
alternative routes: the Automatic Route, which does not require approval 
by the Indian government, and the Approval Route.248 The Automatic 
Route is available to foreign investors in certain sectors and up to a 
certain percentage called “Sectoral Caps.”249 FDI is prohibited in the 
following sectors: (1) business of chit fund; (2) nidhi company; (3) real 
estate business; (4) trading in Transferable Development Rights 
(“TDRs”); (5) retail trading; (6) atomic energy; (7) lottery business; (8) 
gambling and betting; (9) and agriculture.250 
A foreign private equity firm may also register with SEBI as a 
Foreign Venture Capital Investor (“FVCI”).251 Registration as a FVCI 
has substantial benefits for the private equity investor both when 
acquiring the target and when exiting the investment through an IPO, 
which are discussed below in Parts II.C.2 and II.C.4, respectively. 
However, a registered FVCI is subject to the following conditions: (1) it 
must disclose its investment strategy to SEBI and achieve its investment 
targets by the end of a set life cycle; (2) at least 66.67% of the FVCI’s 
funds must be invested in unlisted equities; and (3) no more than 33.3% 
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may be invested by way of subscription to shares offered in an IPO, debt 
instruments of its portfolio companies or stock in a listed distressed 
company.252 
Special rules are in place for portfolio investments by foreign 
institutional investors (“FII”).253 A FII can invest up to 10% of the 
equity capital of an Indian company and the aggregate investment of FII 
in a single company may not exceed 24%.254 The Indian company may 
increase this limit up to the Sectoral Cap by a board resolution that 
receives shareholder approval.255 Subject to these ownership restrictions, 
a FII may freely purchase and sell securities issued by any Indian 
company, and realize and repatriate capital gains.256 
2. Takeovers of Public Targets 
A traditional LBO, in which the acquisition of the target is financed 
through loans collateralized by the target’s assets, is prohibited under 
Indian law.257 However, the private equity investor can increase leverage 
shortly after the acquisition of the target through a recapitalization, in 
which the investor causes the target to make a dividend payment to the 
fund financed by debt.258 
An investor seeking to acquire a stake in a listed company must 
report to the target when its holdings cross thresholds at 5%, 10% and 
14%.259 If an acquisition would result in ownership of 15% or more of 
the voting rights of the target, the acquirer must make a public tender 
offer for at least 20% of the target’s outstanding shares.260 
FDI regulations generally prescribe a minimum price for foreign 
investment in Indian equities, linked to the shares’ net asset value.261 
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However, a registered FVCI is exempted from this purchase price 
restriction.262 
3. Corporate Law and Legal Enforcement 
Indian companies are governed by the Companies Act, 1956.263 
Companies can be public or private, and shareholders can have limited 
or unlimited liability.264 A private company is limited to fifty members 
and subject to certain restrictions on the transfer of shares, including a 
prohibition of a public offering of its shares.265 Its minimum paid up 
capital must be Rs. 100,000 (approximately $2,200).266 A public 
company must have a minimum paid up capital of Rs. 500,000 
(approximately $11,000) and may not impose any restrictions on the 
transferability of its shares.267 
a. Corporate Governance 
Even though room for improvement remains, India’s corporate 
governance framework is relatively advanced for a developing 
country.268 SEBI first introduced mandatory corporate governance 
standards in India through Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement of Stock 
Exchanges, which contains corporate governance requirements for 
exchange-traded companies.269 Under Clause 49, the Chairman of the 
Board should be a non-executive director and at least one-third of the 
directors should be independent, and if the chairman is an executive 
director, half of the directors should be independent.270 Furthermore, 
two-thirds of the members of the audit committee must be independent 
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directors.271 Finally, the exchange-traded firm must submit quarterly 
compliance reports detailing the firm’s compliance with corporate 
governance standards.272 The Companies Bill 2009, which had not yet 
been enacted by the end of 2011,273 makes further improvements, mainly 
in the areas of independent directors, board committees, director duties 
and liabilities, and internal control.274 
Some Indian companies are owned by large families which may 
complicate deal negotiations.275 The process of getting every managing 
member of the family on board and adequately incentivized can take up 
a substantial amount of time.276 
b. Enforceability of Contractual Rights 
India is a common law country and U.S. investors can thus be 
comfortable with the availability and enforceability of contractual 
protections.277 Investors can enter into shareholders’ agreements, and 
most instruments used by private equity firms to ensure returns and 
align incentives278 are available under Indian law. Besides common 
stock, investors are free to use convertible preferred shares, convertible 
debentures or warrants.279 For purposes of FDI restrictions it is 
important to keep in mind, however, that fully convertible shares or 
debentures are deemed equity and thus count towards possible FDI 
caps.280 Warrants, on the other hand, do not count towards FDI caps and 
can therefore be used as “stopgap instruments” in hopes that sector caps 
will be eased in the future.281 However, should the investor choose to 
exit by way of an IPO, outstanding warrants have to be forfeited as all 
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convertible securities must be converted into equity shares prior to an 
IPO under Indian securities laws.282 
Private equity investors commonly employ a ratchet as one means 
to protect against dilution. Such a provision stipulates that in the event 
the company issues additional shares to a third party at a lower price 
than the investor’s entry price, the investor will be entitled to the amount 
of shares necessary to remain at the previous percentage of shares at no 
additional cost.283 However, implementation of this instrument is 
complicated in India because shares are prohibited from being issued at 
a discount to par value.284 Thus, a similar result must be achieved 
through alternative methods, such as a dividend payment to the investor 
or an issuance at the least permissible price.285 Alternatively, the 
investor must seek to obtain a veto right as protection against the 
issuance of additional shares.286 
c. Reliability of the Legal System 
As in other developing countries, litigation in India is slow due to 
the large number of cases judges are assigned to.287 Thus, it may be 
necessary, and is possible, for the investor to rely on arbitration as India 
is a signatory to the 1958 New York Convention.288 Seeking to improve 
the judicial system, the Companies Bill 2009 includes a provision under 
which the government is required to establish a National Company Law 
Tribunal (“NCLT”).289 This tribunal would have exclusive jurisdiction 
over company law cases assigned to it by law and thus provide 
specialization and significant improvement to the speed in which cases 
are decided.290 
Another concern for investors is the tendency of excessive 
rulemaking and broad authority for local authorities.291 Many important 
regulatory decisions can vary from region to region and be subject to 
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strong opposition from local and political constituencies.292 Broad 
discretionary powers of governmental authorities and the lack of 
transparent rules of governance also open the doors for corruption 
despite extensive legislation aimed at fighting these issues.293 Only in 
certain progressive areas can investors operate predominantly free from 
corruption.294 
4. Exiting from the Indian Investment 
Beginning in 1992, India has continuously liberalized and 
improved its capital markets structure.295 Companies raised a record 
high of $8.8 billion in 2007, but IPOs were relatively small in size with 
an average of $83 million.296 However, Reliance Power’s $3 billion IPO 
in 2008 raised hopes for larger deals in the future. 
Though liquidity on Indian equity markets remains low, settlement 
mechanisms are comparable to international standards.297 A company 
seeking to raise funds through an IPO on an Indian stock exchange must 
first submit a “draft red herring prospectus” (“DRHP”) with the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”).298 SEBI’s comments 
are then incorporated in the Red Herring Prospectus (“RHP”), which 
includes a price band within which bidding can proceed.299 Once the 
issue price is determined by the bidding procedure, the issuer must file 
the Prospectus containing the issue price with the Registrar of 
Companies (“RoC”) and the IPO can then be executed according to the 
rules of the stock exchange on which listing is sought.300 Generally, all 
pre-IPO share capital of an Indian company listing in India will be 
locked in for a period of one year following the IPO.301 Thus, an investor 
would not be able to retain its stake (or part of it) in the portfolio 
                                                                                                                 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at ch. 6, § Corruption. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Shroff, supra note 246, at 57. 
 296. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 149. 
 297. USFCS India, supra note 249, at ch. 6, § Efficient Capital Markets and 
Portfolio Investment. 
 298. Shroff, supra note 246, at 62. 
 299. Id. at 63. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Parikh, supra note 243, at 293. 
2012] PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT IN THE BRICS 1347 
company through the IPO and then exit its investment through a sale on 
the exchange. However, an exemption from the lock-in has been carved 
out for registered FVCIs who have held the investment for at least one 
year prior to the IPO.302 SEBI Guidelines also include rules concerning 
so-called “promoters,” which are “a person (or persons) who are in over-
all control of the company who is instrumental in the formulation of a 
plan or program pursuant to which the securities are offered to the 
public.”303 Promoters are also subject to lock-in requirements following 
an IPO to ensure that parent companies continue to hold a stake in the 
issuer post-IPO.304 Since private equity funds often control their targets 
through shareholders’ agreements, they would easily be found to be 
promoters under the SEBI Guidelines.305 However, an exemption again 
exists for registered FVCIs.306 
Due to the lack of liquidity on Indian capital markets, a popular 
way for Indian companies to raise capital is by way of a dual-listing on 
both an international and a domestic exchange. High-tech companies 
typically list in the U.S., but others mainly list on LSE’s Alternate 
Investment Market (“AIM”).307 AIM offers issuers the advantage of 
lower entry and reporting requirements.308 In November 2010, LSE 
announced that five Indian companies had listed on AIM in only ten 
weeks, raising an aggregate of $344.4 million.309 Jubilant Energy’s 
listing took the total number of Indian IPOs on LSE’s markets in 2010 
to 28, with an aggregate amount of $2.3 billion in funds raised.310 If the 
private equity investor wishes to exit through an ADR/GDR program, 
the portfolio company must conform with the Issue of Foreign Currency 
Convertible Bonds and Ordinary Shares (Through Depository Receipt 
Mechanism) Scheme, 1993 (“1993 Scheme”).311 The Indian company 
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must either already be listed or simultaneously list on an Indian stock 
exchange.312 Significantly, depository receipts are treated as FDI so that 
foreign ownership of depository receipts is subject to Indian FDI sector 
caps.313 Aside from being subject to FDI restrictions, however, Indian 
companies may issue ADRs or GDRs without prior approval by Indian 
regulatory authorities.314 
Alternatively, the private equity investor may seek to exit through a 
private sale to a strategic buyer or another private equity fund. A sale to 
a later-stage private equity investor is impeded by the prohibition of 
LBOs, but can be facilitated through subsequent recapitalizations.315 
Moreover, the exit price a foreign entity can demand when selling to an 
Indian buyer is capped under FDI regulations.316 The maximum amount 
the foreign seller can ask for is the stock market price if the company is 
listed, or, more likely, the net asset value of the unlisted shares.317 
However, registered FVCIs are exempt from exit pricing restrictions.318 
Further, promoters will not be required to make a mandatory public 
offer under the Takeover Code if they buy back shares from FVCIs, 
provided that the portfolio company will be subsequently listed on an 
exchange.319 
D. CHINA 
Even China’s economy was affected by the global financial crisis. 
After having growth rates above 10%, from 2003 to 2007, China’s GDP 
growth rate dropped to 9.6% in 2008 and 9.2% in 2009.320 While 
China’s government responded quickly with a $586 billion stimulus 
package321 that brought its growth rate in 2010 back over the 10%-
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benchmark at 10.4%, it fell again to 9.3% in 2011.322 According to JP 
Morgan Asset Management, China’s rise in productivity will be the 
driving factor for high future returns in China.323 
Chinese regulators have become increasingly sophisticated and, 
with experience, regulations are becoming clearer and more user-
friendly.324 In addition, the Ministry of Commerce (“MOC”), which has 
traditionally exercised the authority to approve foreign investments, has 
delegated the power to approve smaller deals to local authorities, 
resulting in a faster and more certain approval process.325 In August 
2008, MOC published the Foreign Investment Market Entry 
Administrative Guidance Handbook, providing detailed instructions on 
application procedures, documentation and applicable timelines.326 
China has become the largest net importer of private equity and 
venture capital investment.327 Private equity in China is usually in the 
form of minority growth capital.328 LBOs face significant obstacles 
because Chinese foreign invested entities (“FIE”) are subject to debt to 
leverage ratios between 0.43:1.00 and 2.00:1.00 depending on the 
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entity’s registered capital, and the MOC does not approve transactions 
in which debt financing is secured by the target’s assets.329 Thus, the 
enforceability of minority shareholder protections is a major concern for 
private equity investors.330 Typically, private equity funds investing in 
China have been set up as offshore funds to take advantage of 
preferential tax treatment and to avoid oversight by Chinese 
authorities.331 In a recent development, however, the Chinese 
government has permitted foreign investors to establish foreign-invested 
partnerships (“FIP”) that mainly engage in the investment business.332 
Such FIPs will make it easier for private equity firms to set up onshore 
funds that operate in China’s currency RMB (so-called “RMB funds”), 
thus avoiding both the approval difficulties associated with offshore 
investment structures and the risk of an appreciating RMB.333 The 
number of RMB funds has grown substantially in recent years and in 
2009, the number of deals done by RMB funds for the first time 
exceeded those sponsored by foreign funds.334 
1. Foreign Direct Investment 
In 2009, China’s net inflows of FDI amounted to $147.8 billion, up 
from $79.1 billion in 2005, making China only second in net FDI 
inflows behind the U.S.335 As any other country, China encourages or 
restricts FDI in certain industry sectors. Generally, FDI is deemed to be 
allowed unless restricted or prohibited in the Catalogue for the Guidance 
of Foreign Investment Industries.336 Moreover, the Catalogue contains 
industries that are marked as “encouraged.”337 Currently, FDI is 
encouraged in high technology and certain service industries, but 
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prohibited in industries involving non-renewable natural resources, and 
businesses that may affect national security, such as news websites and 
internet providers.338 FDI is restricted in securities companies and 
discouraged in solely export-oriented businesses.339 
Foreign investors can only invest through FIEs.340 The most 
common FIEs are equity joint ventures, wholly foreign owned 
enterprises and foreign invested companies limited by shares. 341 If no 
industry sector restrictions apply, a foreign investor is generally 
permitted to purchase equity securities of a domestic enterprise or to 
subscribe to newly issued shares of a domestic entity, but the price paid 
must constitute at least 90% of the securities’ appraised value.342 
Moreover, participation in Chinese enterprises below 25% is not 
encouraged and may be excluded from certain preferential treatment of 
foreign investment.343 Purchase or subscription agreements must be 
governed by Chinese law, and the domestic enterprise must be 
converted into a FIE, unless the target is already a FIE.344 
2. Takeovers of Public Targets 
The Chinese mainland capital markets are divided in an A-share 
market and a B-share market.345 A-shares are denominated and traded in 
RMB, and traded on both the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange.346 B-shares are denominated in U.S. dollars 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, but denominated in Hong Kong 
dollars on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.347 In addition, H-shares are 
shares issued by Chinese joint stock companies, traded on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange, and denominated in Hong Kong dollars.348 
Acquisition and trade of A-shares of a Chinese company listed on a 
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Chinese stock exchange by foreign investors is limited. Certain foreign 
financial institutions can purchase and hold no more than 10% of 
outstanding A-shares of a listed company through the qualified foreign 
institutional investor scheme.349 “Strategic investors” are permitted to 
acquire a controlling stake in a Chinese listed company through a 
private purchase of shares from existing shareholders or a private 
placement of new shares by the listed company if they own offshore 
assets of at least $100 million or manage offshore assets of at least $500 
million.350 The share purchase must exceed 10% of the target’s 
outstanding shares and must be submitted to the MOC for approval.351 
Importantly, the investor must agree to hold the purchased shares for at 
least three years.352 
An investor who acquires shares of a listed company through a 
stock exchange must report its holdings once it crosses the 5% threshold 
and then upon every crossing of a multiple of 5%.353 An investor seeking 
to take over a publicly listed company must make a general offer to all 
target shareholders if it intends to acquire more than 30% of the target’s 
outstanding shares.354 The acquirer must prepare a detailed prospectus 
containing purchase price, shares to be acquired, sources of the 
necessary funds and any special terms of the offer.355 Upon receipt of the 
prospectus, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) has 
15 days to object to and stop the offer.356 To the benefit of the investor, 
however, the target is prohibited from employing dilutive measures, 
such as a poison pill, or other means to prevent the takeover.357 
3. Corporate Law and Legal Enforcement 
China’s new Company Law, which became effective on January 1, 
2006, provided several changes that allowed for more flexibility in 
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structuring foreign private equity investments.358 Subject to the consent 
of all shareholders, the company’s profits may be distributed to 
shareholders independent from their proportionate stake in the company, 
suggesting that under the new Company Law, a private equity 
investment could be structured with different classes of shares.359 Going 
in the same direction, the corporate charter can provide that voting rights 
are allocated without regard to the respective shareholding percentage.360 
However, the law governing FIEs still requires that economic interests 
in a FIE are distributed according to each shareholder’s pro rata interest 
in the FIE, thus making it difficult for FIEs to adopt a multiple-class 
share structure.361 Private equity investors can protect their investment 
against dilution by adopting a charter provision that gives shareholders a 
preemptive right to make further equity contributions in the event the 
company proposed to issue fresh capital.362 Further, investors can be 
granted tag-along and drag-along rights.363 
The new Company Law also introduced new corporate governance 
provisions, including express duties of care and loyalty imposed on a 
company’s directors and senior management.364 Moreover, the 
company’s information available to shareholders upon request has been 
extended to articles of association, financial reports, accounting books 
and board and shareholders’ meeting minutes.365 
a. Enforceability of Contractual Rights 
While the new Company Law introduced many provisions that 
allow for a more flexible and thus more attractive private equity 
investment structure, these changes are still relatively new to Chinese 
law and the enforcement of vehicles such as tag-along and drag-along 
rights has not yet been tested in Chinese courts.366 “Contracting-out” by 
choosing the law of a different jurisdiction to govern the investment is 
not available to the investor as Chinese law is mandatory in regard to the 
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transfer of equity interests in Chinese companies.367 In order to avoid 
Chinese regulatory oversight and to choose a more certain governing 
law and venue, private equity investors have commonly employed an 
offshore investment structure dubbed “outbound-inbound,” “round-
tripping” or “red-chip” investment.368 Under such a structure, the 
Chinese target’s shareholders invest alongside with the private equity 
fund in an offshore vehicle which then acquires the target as a wholly 
foreign owned enterprise.369 Thus, on the offshore level all the 
investment protections and structures commonly found in private equity 
deals can be implemented, including investment by the private equity 
fund through convertible preferred shares.370 However, in order to 
prevent significant loss in tax revenue, the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”) moved to curb round-tripping in 2005 by 
requiring Chinese residents to register and obtain approval from SAFE 
when intending to invest in an offshore vehicle.371 In addition, the 
domestic entity must disclose the intended shareholding structure to 
MOC and obtain approval to invest in an offshore special purpose 
vehicle (“SPV”) under the Provisions on Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the “2006 M&A Rules”).372 The MOC 
has not yet approved any such transaction since the 2006 M&A Rules 
became effective.373 Consequently, private equity firms must now 
consider to “go onshore” by investing directly into Chinese target 
companies.374 So far, many private equity firms still benefit from the fact 
that investments made prior to the 2006 M&A Rules becoming 
effective, as well as subsequent restructurings of such investments, are 
not subject to the new regulation.375 Thus, it still remains to be seen to 
what extent private equity firms will be willing to invest onshore in the 
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future. In this context, shareholders’ agreements will likely become 
more common to protect the investment.376 
b. Reliability of the Legal System 
China does not have a well-developed reporting system for judicial 
decisions, and judicial decisions do not have precedential effect 
comparable to that in common law systems.377 This creates uncertainty 
regarding the availability and enforceability of some of the typical 
investor protection devices found in private equity deals, such as 
preferred stock and redemption rights.378 In the context of government 
approvals, it is crucial to communicate with the responsible authorities 
at an early stage to assess how the statutory law will be implemented.379 
Most agreements on foreign-related transactions include an 
arbitration clause.380  Chinese law provides for the enforcement of 
arbitration clauses and arbitral awards are typically enforced by Chinese 
courts without a review on the merits.381 The Chinese government has 
established the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (“CIETAC”) in Beijing which has a reputation for being 
fair and relatively experienced in transactional matters.382 If the investor 
prefers a neutral location for the arbitration, Hong Kong is a frequent 
choice for its close proximity to China and yet Western approach to 
business transactions.383 
                                                                                                                 
 376. TAO & NEE, supra note 349, § 7:22. 
 377. Henry Wang, Developing Savvy M&A Strategies in China, in BEST PRACTICES 
FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN CHINA, LEADING LAWYERS ON 
STRUCTURING AND NEGOTIATING TRADE TRANSACTIONS, UNDERSTANDING THE 
IMPORTANCE OF DUE DILIGENCE, AND WORKING AS A LEGAL PROFESSIONAL IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY (2009), available at 2009 WL 1007716 *54. 
 378. Feist et al., supra note 328, at 2. 
 379. Wang, supra note 377, at 56; see also Jeanette K. Chan, Tackling New 
Regulatory Challenges for M&A in China, in BEST PRACTICES FOR MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA: LEADING LAWYERS ON CLOSING A SUCCESSFUL TRANSACTION, 
NAVIGATING THE NEW ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN (2010), available at 2010 WL 1976200, at *3. 
 380. Wang, supra note 377, at 60; see also Shen, supra note 33, at 209. 
 381. Wang, supra note 377, at 60. 
 382. Id. at 61. 
 383. Id. at 60-61. 
1356 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
4. Exiting from the Chinese Investment 
With 259 deals for a total of $66 billion, Greater China led the 
world in both number of deals and total funds raised in 2007.384 The 
Chinese domestic capital markets saw high volatility during the 
financial crisis, with the Shanghai Stock Exchange dropping from a 
record high of 6,124.04 points in October 2007 to 1,664.93 points in 
October 2008.385 This led to the CSRC suspending IPOs in September 
2008.386 Post-crisis, however, an IPO on a domestic exchange is the 
most popular exit strategy for private equity firms.387 IPO volume on the 
Shanghai and Shenzen Stock Exchanges combined reached $72.1 billion 
in 2010, for the first time topping the volume of listings in Hong Kong 
and New York.388 This development is mainly due to two factors. First, 
the regulations restricting round-trip investments have effectively 
excluded a large number of Chinese companies from listing on a foreign 
exchange, such as in Hong Kong or New York.389 Second, the CSRC in 
2009 launched the Growth Enterprise Market (“GEM”) on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, allowing Chinese companies with a relatively low 
profit of RMB 5,000,000390 to list, provided that the revenue growth rate 
was at least 30% in the prior two years.391 The GEM provides an 
attractive alternative to a listing on one of China’s larger market 
segments, and especially compared to a costly listing abroad.392 As of 
April 2010, about 75% of IPOs on GEM were private equity-backed.393 
Additionally, mainland Chinese companies historically trade at a 
premium compared to mainland Chinese companies listed in Hong 
Kong, mainly because the restrictions on mainland Chinese residents to 
invest abroad create a “shortage in supply” on mainland exchanges.394 
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Prior to the 2006 regulations restricting round-tripping structures, 
exits through listings on international exchanges were preferred by 
private equity investors.395 Since more and more investors now have to 
invest directly into domestic Chinese entities,396 listings abroad have 
become less popular and the investors can often obtain higher valuations 
for their portfolio companies on domestic exchanges.397 However, 
should the investor wish to exit through an offshore listing, it is possible 
for the investor to “swap” the interests in the Chinese company for 
shares of an offshore entity and subsequently list the now offshore entity 
on an exchange abroad.398 The domestic company and the offshore 
entity must obtain approval from the MOC and conduct the offshore 
IPO within one year from the approval date.399 
Additionally, more private equity investors now consider a private 
sale or a stock repurchase by the portfolio company as a major exit 
strategy.400 In considering a private sale, the investor has to keep in mind 
that every M&A transaction in China, independent of its size and 
industry, requires government approval.401 Especially large deals that 
require approval by the central government can be very time 
consuming.402 
CONCLUSION 
“One group comprises those that have displayed remarkable 
resilience during the global financial crisis. This group of ‘winners’ 
includes Brazil, China, India . . . .”403 “Russia has experienced a very 
difficult crisis, which raises concerns about its long-term growth trend,” 
but “Russia had performed better than our expectations until the crisis, 
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and, if it recovers strongly and quickly in 2010 and 2011, as we expect, 
we believe it will deserve its BRIC status.”404 Is this assessment of the 
larger economic development of the BRICs by Goldman Sachs’s Jim 
O’Neill also valid for the private equity sector? How has the legal and 
political framework in the BRICs developed to foster foreign private 
equity investment that can contribute to economic growth? 
All four countries have significantly improved their corporate law. 
While many changes are still in their infancy and have not yet been 
thoroughly tested, the level of sophistication is in most cases 
comparable to that of developed countries. Thus, with a few exceptions, 
private equity investors generally find all the necessary tools, from 
convertible preferred stock schemes to covenants and anti-dilution 
protection, to structure a successful private equity investment. The need 
for improvement remains in regard to the uncertainties surrounding the 
enforceability of shareholders’ agreements in Russia and the availability 
of convertible preferred shares in China. Differences in the corporate 
governance level appear not so much in the black letter law, but rather in 
the actual ownership structures of the local businesses. In Brazil, as well 
as in Russia, concentrated ownership and family-dominated 
management can create agency costs and disputes between management 
and investor. However, while in Brazil this is a problem mainly 
associated with older, more mature companies, investors still name 
untrustworthy partners as the main reason to abandon deals in Russia, 
where many insiders benefited from large scale government 
privatizations. In India, it can be difficult to negotiate deals when 
companies are owned and run by large families and each family 
member’s approval must be sought. 
Governments cannot directly regulate the factual ownership 
structures of their businesses. Thus, one could argue that this is an area 
beyond governmental reach. However, improving corporate governance 
structures is an important lever that private equity firms employ when 
seeking to increase the target’s value for a later exit, preferably through 
a public listing. Thus, by opening markets to the private sector and by 
further encouraging private equity investment, governments can invite 
the players they need to break up concentrated ownership structures and 
make management accountable. While all BRICs, just as any developed 
nations, restrict FDI in certain strategic sectors, government interference 
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appears to be particularly significant in Russia and China. In Russia, it is 
the vast amount of restricted sectors (42) that still limit foreign private 
equity investment in many areas. It remains to be seen whether the 
Russian government follows through with its promise to ease limitations 
in some of the industry sectors. In China, interference is manifested 
through the many obligatory government approvals, not only for FDI 
but also any domestic M&A transactions. Importantly, it seems that it is 
at least relatively predictable under what circumstances government 
approvals will be granted. In India, the relatively strict FDI regime is 
substantially mitigated for private equity investors by the possibility to 
register as a FVCI. 
The analysis of the corporate laws and securities regulation in the 
BRICs shows that the legal framework is relatively developed in all four 
countries. Difficulties, however, arise in the implementation of legal 
rules. Judicial systems in the BRICs are slow and often still 
inexperienced or overwhelmed by a heavy case load. This can lead to 
major delays and/or hasty, ill-informed judicial decisions when judges 
attempt to reduce their docket quickly. Therefore, resorting to arbitration 
is a must and a viable alternative as all four BRICs are signatories to the 
1958 New York Convention. A more difficult challenge to sidestep is 
corruption, which is still a major concern especially in Russia. Despite 
the Russian government’s efforts to curb corruption, Russia still ranks 
only 143rd out of 182 nations on the Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index. Corruption is a significant deterrent in 
particular for U.S. investors, given the liabilities U.S. entities face under 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 
A common technique for private equity investors to evade weak 
legal systems is the so-called round-tripping or red-chip structure. Aside 
from advantageous tax treatment, this enables investors to structure their 
investment under a favorable and reliable legal system which allows for 
the legal instruments and investor protections commonly employed in 
private equity deals. The consequences of this form of regulatory 
arbitrage for the host countries are a loss of both tax revenue and 
regulatory grasp of foreign investment. Among the BRICs, round-
tripping is still the prevalent structure in Russia and was in China until 
the 2006 M&A Rules introduced severe limitations. Many investments 
into China were made prior to the new regulation becoming effective 
and thus are not subject to the approval requirements. It still has to be 
seen whether foreign private equity investors will, to the same extent, be 
willing to invest through onshore structures in the future. However, it 
seems that instead of imposing restrictions on round-tripping, it would 
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be preferable to implement reforms domestically that render such 
arbitrage unnecessary. 
Finally, the availability of an IPO exit, preferably on a domestic 
exchange, is the driving force for the growth of private equity in the 
emerging markets. The difficulties Russian companies face when 
seeking to access domestic or international capital markets appear to 
explain to a substantial degree why Russia is trailing behind the other 
three BRIC countries. Brazil took decisive steps to make its domestic 
capital markets more attractive and to entice liquidity, in particular 
through the introduction of Novo Mercado. China had large success 
with the establishment of the Growth Enterprise Market on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which compensates for the fact that offshore 
listings have become difficult under the more restrictive regulation. In 
India, while the domestic markets are still lacking liquidity, companies 
have relatively easy access to capital on LSE’s Alternative Investment 
Market. In Russia, however, an IPO is often neither available 
domestically nor on an international exchange. While both the number 
and volume of domestic IPOs have increased in recent years, these 
numbers were mainly driven by large, often formerly state-owned 
companies. For the majority, the Russian capital markets still do not 
offer the necessary liquidity. Therefore, Russian companies routinely 
seek to list abroad, predominantly on the LSE. However, Russian 
securities regulation severely limits the amount of shares that can be 
listed abroad through an ADR/GDR program in order to induce issuers 
to list at home. Again, strengthening the domestic markets by reforming 
applicable regulation and further enhancing access for foreign 
investment seems to be a preferable response over imposing restrictions 
on listings abroad. 
The analysis of the environment for private equity in the four 
BRICs indicates that Brazil offers the most attractive legal, economic 
and political environment for private equity investments. Yet, China 
leads the market for foreign private equity, partly by sheer size and 
growth opportunity, but also because it offers, despite its restrictions for 
foreign investors, a reliable legal system and viable opportunities for an 
exit by way of an IPO. Once China reduces the amount of government 
involvement, it will become an even more attractive market for private 
equity. India offers growth opportunities similar to those in China, but 
will have to improve the liquidity of its domestic capital markets, as 
well as the regulatory transparency. It appears that Russia has the most 
room for improvement. First, Russia will need to have more success in 
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fighting corruption. Second, it will need to offer private equity investors 
better exit strategies. In the short term, this would be possible by easing 
restrictions for listings on international exchanges. In the long term, 
Russia must increase the attractiveness of its domestic capital markets. 
Brazil’s high corporate governance Novo Mercado and China’s middle 
market GEM serve as model examples. 
